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Abstract
We explore the role of the composition of government spending for the cyclical
properties of fiscal variables and for the volatility of the business cycles. In the U.S.,
the fraction of mandatory spending in total government outlays increased from around
0.40 to 0.60 during the last 50 years, while the share of total government outlays in
national output stayed relatively constant during this period. We distinguish manda-
tory and discretionary public spending in a standard model of optimal fiscal policy
and show that the composition of government spending is able to explain a fraction
of the reduction in output volatility during the Great Moderation and an increase in
the countercyclicality of fiscal policy in the U.S. This is another argument in support
of the “rules-based” fiscal policy rather than fiscal discretion.
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1 Introduction
The structure of government spending is an important determinant of the impact of fiscal
policy on economic outcomes. For example, defense-oriented government spending is likely
to enhance the military industry development, while socially-oriented government outlays
are likely to expand the public services sector. These two types of spending differ in their
impact on the composition of output and employment. The government decision about
the allocations of public funds across different spending categories may have long-lasting
consequences for the economy.
In this paper we explore the role of the composition of government spending for the
cyclical properties of fiscal variables and for the volatility of the business cycle. We con-
sider classification of total government spending in two components: mandatory and dis-
cretionary spending. Discretionary spending is expenditure that is governed by annual
or other periodic appropriations (possible examples are defense and public order spend-
ing). Mandatory spending is expenditure that is governed by law, rather than by periodic
appropriations (possible examples are health care and social security). Different legisla-
tive nature of government spending components implies their distinct roles in fiscal policy
process. Mandatory spending is taken as given by the government in power (unless the
government willingness to enforce the change the laws exceeds the cost of such legislative
changes, which we rule out here by assumption). Discretionary spending is a policy tool
that can be used by the government in power to maximize its objectives. We incorporate
these two government spending components into the neoclassical model with a government
that conducts optimal fiscal policy. The model successfully replicates a number of moments
from the U.S. data over the period 1962-2014. We use the model to show that: 1) Higher
fraction of mandatory public spending in total government spending reduces economic
volatility. The historical pattern of mandatory and discretionary government spending in
the U.S. can explain 10% of the reduction in output volatility during the Great Moder-
ation. 2) Higher fraction of discretionary spending leads to procyclicality of fiscal policy
as documented for developing countries. 3) Higher fraction of mandatory spending leads
to acyclicality or countercyclicality of fiscal policy as documented for developed countries.
Accounting for a change in the structure of government spending in the U.S. allows to ex-
plain a fraction of the increase in the U.S. fiscal policy countercyclicality during the last 50
years. These findings suggest that fiscal policy rules are superior to discretion and should
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be enhanced by the policymakers.
In our model, both components of public spending are useful. Discretionary spending is
decided by the government and delivers utility to the government but not necessarily to the
households. Mandatory spending is enjoyed by the households and is taken as given by the
government (it is set by the independent legislation outside the model). We model private
consumption and mandatory spending as two components of the effective consumption
enjoyed by the household.
Our work is related to several streams of research on the sources of volatility and
cyclicality of fiscal policy.
First, our work contributes to the discussion on whether government spending, and
discretionary spending in particular, stabilizes or destabilizes output. Fatás and Mihov
(2003) provide empirical evidence that governments that intensively rely on discretionary
spending induce significant macroeconomic volatility which lowers economic growth. The
authors emphasize the importance of political factors in the fiscal policy conduct: insti-
tutional arrangements that constrain discretion allow to reduce macroeconomic volatility.
Andrés, Doménech, and Fatás (2008) analyze how alternative models of the business cycle
can replicate the fact that large governments are associated with less volatile economies
(as shown, among others, by Fatás and Mihov, 2001). The authors conclude that adding
nominal rigidities and costs of capital adjustment to an otherwise standard RBC model can
generate a negative correlation between government size and the volatility of output. It
this study we are able to generate a negative correlation between a fraction of discretionary
spending in total public spending and the volatility of output, given the government size.
Second, our findings add to the literature on the possible causes of the decline in
macroeconomic volatility in the mid 1980s – the Great Moderation. Stock and Watson
(2003), Bernanke (2004), Summers (2005), and Galí and Gambetti (2009), among many
others, discuss three possible explanations of the Great Moderation: structural changes
in the economy, better monetary policy, and “good luck”. In this work we suggest that
better fiscal policy could also have contributed to the decline in the volatility of the U.S.
macroeconomic time series.
Third, our results are related to the recent political economy literature, if we admit
that the fraction of discretionary public spending depends on the political frictions in the
country. For instance, Ilzetski (2011), Tornell and Lane (1999), Alesina, Campante, and
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Tabellini (2008) and Woo (2009) use political frictions to explain procyclicality of fiscal
policy in developing countries.1 Azzimonti and Talbert (2014) use the political frictions
in the form of political polarization and ideological shifts in the society to explain higher
volatility of business cycles in developing economies. We obtain that higher fraction of
discretionary public spending in total public spending, other things being equal, leads to
both more procyclical fiscal policy and more volatile business cycles.
Fourth, our work is related to the literature on modeling of the cyclical properties of
government spending, such as Bachmann and Bai (2013) who match the volatility and
persistence of government consumption in the U.S. using a time-consistent model with
taste shocks for public consumption and implementation lags and implementation costs in
the budgeting process. We do not impose the time-consistency requirement in the model
presented in this paper; our robustness checks suggest that the time-consistent policy
version (solved under assumptions of Markov strategies by the government and by the
representative household) would result in the same qualitative conclusions.
Finally, our results reiterate the theoretical findings by Bowen, Chen and Eraslan (2014)
that mandatory spending Pareto dominates discretionary spending under the assumptions
generally consistent with characteristics of developed economies.2 We use a quantita-
tive procedure to show that mandatory spending decreases output volatility and increases
countercyclicality of fiscal policy, both of which are usually considered as welfare-enhancing
changes.
Thus, our contribution to the existing literature is to quantify the role of the compo-
sition of public spending for the cyclical properties of fiscal policy and to compare the
impact of discretionary and mandatory public spending on macroeconomic volatility.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the pattern of mandatory and discre-
tionary components of government spending and the cyclical properties of several macroe-
conomic variables in the U.S. before and after the Great Moderation. Section 3 describes
the model and its calibration to the U.S. data. Section 4 applies the model to analyze the
consequences of a change in the structure of government spending, provides intuition and
several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
1Procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing countries compared to industrial countries was demon-
strated, among others, by Lane 2003; Kaminsky et al. 2005; and Talvi and Vegh 2005.
2The assumptions include low political polarization, low persistence of power, and patient parties.
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Figure 1: Discretionary and mandatory spending as a share of total government spending
in the U.S.
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Data source: Historical Tables of the United States Government Budget.
2 The Cyclical Properties of Mandatory and Discre-
tionary Spending
In this section we review the characteristics of mandatory and discretionary government
spending in the U.S. and present several correlation coefficients that have motivated us to
analyze the role of the structure of public spending in the business cycles volatility.
Figure 1 presents the discretionary and mandatory public spending shares of total govern-
ment outlays in the U.S. over the period 1962-2014. This data is from the Historical Tables
of the United States Government Budget. The share of mandatory spending was around
30% of total outlays in the 1960s; it increased to 50% during 1970-1975; then stayed stable
at around 50% in 1980s; and continued increasing reaching around 60% in the late 1990s;
it has been fluctuating around 60% since then. At the same time, during 1962-2014, the
share of total outlays in the GDP has been fluctuating around a constant value of 18%
without significant breaks. The upward shift of the U.S. mandatory spending share after
1980s coincided with a general decline in macroeconomic volatility known as the Great
Moderation.
We conjecture that higher fraction of mandatory spending in total government spending
could be one of the important components of the “rules-based” macroeconomic policy which
5
Figure 2: The fraction of “social” expenditures in total government expenditures and output
volatility in OECD.
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Data source: the OECD statistics.
contributed to macroeconomic stability (similar to the “rule-based” monetary policy as
discussed by Taylor, 2012). The tendency for a country to have less volatile output when
the share of mandatory public spending is larger seems to hold not only for the United
States. Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of the relationship between the GDP volatility over
the period 1995-2014 and the average share of the proxy for mandatory spending in total
government spending over that period for OECD countries. The proxy for mandatory
spending is constructed as the sum of government spending on health, social security and
education.3 These data suggest that countries characterized by lower fraction of mandatory
spending in total public spending tend to have higher output volatility.
In further analysis we compare the properties of the U.S. data for the entire period 1962-
2014 and for two subperiods – 1962-1984 and 1985-2014 – which reflect pre- and post-Great
Moderation years (Stock and Watson, 2003). Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics
for the main variables of interest.
The information contained in Table 1 can be summarized as follows:
3We have not found the time-series for exact measure of mandatory spending in OECD countries.
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Table 1: The cyclical properties of economic variables in the U.S. before and after 1985.
Time Mean St. dev. in % Corr.
period m/G G/Y C/Y L Y G C L (G, Y )
1962-1984 0.40 0.18 0.63 0.32 2.50 4.32 1.94 1.02 -0.17
1985-2014 0.57 0.18 0.67 0.31 1.70 4.28 1.72 0.41 -0.47
For the calculation of standard deviation and correlation the variables are de-trended using differences of
logarithms. Data sources: Historical Tables of the United States Government Budget, the World Bank
and the OECD statistics.
1. The average fraction of mandatory public spending in total public spending increased
after 1985; the average fraction of discretionary public spending in total public spend-
ing decreased after 1985.
2. The average share of public consumption does not differ significantly in the periods
before and after 1985.
3. Macroeconomic volatility decreased after 1980s (Great Moderation): the standard
deviation of real GDP growth rate is 2.50 before 1985, and 1.70 after 1985. Private
consumption expenditures and labor hours are also less volatile after 1985.
4. Fiscal policy is more countercyclical after 1980s: correlation of the growth rates of
government spending and output is -0.17 before 1985 and -0.47 after 1985.
In this paper we evaluate the importance of facts 1 and 2 for the explanation of facts
3 and 4 with the help of the model presented in the next section.
3 The Model
The model represents a version of the neoclassical model with government and with a dis-
tinction between mandatory and discretionary public spending. The government finances
public spending with a flat rate income tax and issues of risk-free public bonds. Below,
the economy is described in more detail.
3.1 The economic environment
The model economy is inhabited by infinitely-lived households; time is discrete. A rep-
resentative household derives utility from private consumption, ct and from (possibly a
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fraction of) government spending; it dislikes labor, lt, and is endowed by one unit of time
every period. Total government spending, Gt, consists of mandatory spending, mt, and
discretionary spending, gt. Mandatory spending is governed by legislation and its law of
motion is taken as given by the households and by the government. This category of
spending may include health, education, and other social benefits. Discretionary spending
is governed by periodic appropriations, through the decision of the government as a part of
fiscal policy. This category of spending may include expenditures on defence, public order,
and justice. Following Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004), we may refer to mandatory spending
as “merit goods” and to discretionary spending as “public goods”.
The households enjoy consumption of “merit goods” (mandatory spending) as well as
their private consumption. In particular, we assume the Cobb-Douglas form for the effective
household consumption as follows:4
Ct = c
ρ
tm
1−ρ
t , ρ ∈ (0, 1). (1)
There are several possible interpretations for the mission of “public goods” (discretionary
spending) gt, which result from the fact that this type of spending can be chosen by the
government.
First, we could think of discretionary public spending as providing utility to the rep-
resentative household and of a benevolent government that seeks to maximize households’
welfare by choosing the level of discretionary spending.
Second, we could think of discretionary public spending as providing the opportunity
to the government to collect private rent. The simplest way to reflect such situation in a
model is to assume that “public goods” deliver utility to the government but not to the
households. Such political friction caused by weak institutions has been widely discussed
in the literature and has been shown to lead to procyclical government spending (see, for
example, Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini, 2008).
Third, we could think of the existence of different types of discretionary public spend-
ing which provide utility to different groups of households in a society characterized by
polarized preferences about the composition of public goods. In order to add such political
friction, called political polarization, to the model, we could assume, among other things,
that the party in power maximizes the utility of its electorate – the group of households
that shares the preferences of that party. Political polarization has been shown to lead to
4We discuss a more general form for the effective consumption in the robustness checks.
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procyclical government spending (Woo, 2009) and more volatile business cycles (Azzimonti
and Talbert, 2014).
The complete models of public rent-seeking or political polarization would require ad-
ditional assumptions and model ingredients5 which are not of the main interest in this
paper. Therefore, we consider the first interpretation as the baseline but we keep in mind
that the second and third interpretations are also relevant. We assume (consistent with all
three cases) that the utility from discretionary public spending is separable from the util-
ity from private consumption, mandatory public spending, and leisure, and has a weight
ϕg ∈ [0, 1) in the total utility of the household. We use the following function for the total
instantaneous utility of the household:
u(ct,mt, 1− lt, gt) = ϕc (c
ρ
tm
1−ρ
t )
1−υc
1− υc + ϕl
(1− lt)1−υl
1− υl + ϕg
g
1−υg
t
1− υg , (2)
where ϕc, ϕl > 0.
The economy’s physical capital stock at period t, kt−1, is owned by the representative
household which supplies it together with labor to the competitive firm, receiving interest,
rt, for each unit of capital and wage, wt, for each unit of labor in return. Physical capital
depreciates at rate δ. The household can also save in the form of risk-free government
bonds, bt, which, purchased in period t at price pt, deliver the amount of bt of consumption
goods in period t + 1. The holdings of government bonds involve a quadratic transaction
cost proportional to the amount of bonds purchased, φb2t , φ > 0. This cost is rebated back
to the household as a lump-sum transfer (the presence of debt transaction cost rules out
non-stationary debt dynamics). We assume, without loss of generality, that the economy
starts with zero public debt, b−1 = 0. The total household income is subject to the
proportional income tax, τt.
The competitive firm operates the constant returns to scale production function which
combines capital and labor to produce output, yt. In particular, we assume the Cobb-
Douglas production function:
yt = Atk
a
t−1l
1−a
t , a ∈ (0, 1), (3)
where At denotes stochastic technology which follows the law of motion specified below.
5such as the possibility of political turnover and periodic reoptimization of the fiscal plan by the
government.
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Given government policy, a representative household chooses its consumption, labor,
and savings to maximize its expected lifetime utility, given by the sum of expected instan-
taneous utilities (2), discounted by the impatience parameter β ∈ (0, 1), subject to the
budget constraint:
s.t. : ct + kt + ptbt + φb
2
t = (1− τt)(wtlt + rtkt) + (1− δ)kt−1 + bt−1. (4)
The optimality conditions corresponding to the household’s problem consist of (4) to-
gether with the following equations:
ul,t + uc,t(1− τt)wt = 0, (5)
uc,t − βEtuc,t+1((1− τt+1)rt+1 + 1− δ) = 0. (6)
pt = βEt
uct+1
uct
− 2φbt. (7)
Given the competitive markets, the prices of capital and labor are equal to their
marginal products:
rt = aAtk
a−1
t−1 l
1−a
t , (8)
wt = (1− a)Atkat−1l−at . (9)
The resource constraint of the economy is as follows:
ct + kt + gt +mt − (1− δ)kt−1 − yt = 0. (10)
We approximate the exogenous states of the economy, the level of technology At and
the level of mandatory public spending mt, by the autoregressive processes of order one
(AR(1)). In particular, we assume that the logarithm of technology follows an AR(1)
process with mean lnA¯, autocorrelation coefficient ρA, and volatility σ2A:
lnAt = (1− ρA) ln A¯+ ρA lnAt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0, σ2 ), σ2 = σ2A(1− ρ2A); (11)
and the logarithm mandatory public spending follows an AR(1) process with mean
ln(m¯G¯), where m¯ is the average fraction of mandatory spending in total government
spending and G¯ is the average total government spending in the economy, autocorrela-
tion coefficient ρm, and volatility σ2m:
lnmt = (1− ρm) ln(m¯G¯) + ρm lnmt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε), σ2ε = σ2m(1− ρ2m). (12)
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We can define the competitive equilibrium in this economy given the government policy,
the initial capital stock, k−1, and the exogenous processes At and mt, as a sequence of
prices {pt, rt, wt}, allocations {ct, lt}, capital stocks kt, and public bonds issues bt, such
that: given prices, the households maximize their expected lifetime utility subject to their
budget constraint (4); competitive firms maximize their profits; and the resource contraint
of the economy given by (10) is satisfied.
3.2 The government policy
The problem of the benevolent government is to set the income taxes and the amount
of risk-free bonds bt to issue at time t and be repaid at time t + 1 in order to finance
a stream of government spending, thereby maximizing its objective. As discussed above,
we assume that the instantaneous utility of the government coincides with the utility of
the households. The law of motion of mandatory public spending is determined outside
the model and is taken as given by the government. The amount of discretionary public
spending adjusts to equilibrate the government budget, which takes the following form:
Gt + bt−1 = gt +mt + bt−1 = τt(wtlt + rtkt−1) + ptbt. (13)
For simplicity, we assume that the government is able to commit to a fiscal plan developed
for the long term6 and cannot default on its debt obligations. Thus, at the initial period of
the economy life, the government chooses the sequence of income taxes (or, equivalently,
the level of discretionary expenditures) and issues of risk-free public bonds for every period,
given the expectations about the possible states of the economy.
We can define the Ramsey problem of the government as a sequence of taxes and
public bond issues that maximizes the expected lifetime utility of the government over the
competitive equilibria.
It is convenient to formulate the problem of the government in terms of the choice of
6The time-consistent solution with the government which reoptimizes its fiscal plan every time period
does not change the qualitative conclusions.
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household allocations (see appendix for details) as follows:
max
{ct,lt,kt,bt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct,mt, 1− lt, yt + (1− δ)kt−1 − ct − kt −mt) (14)
s.t. : uct(ct + kt − φb2t − (1− δ)kt−1 − bt−1) + βEtuct+1bt +
ul,t
1− alt = 0, (15)
uc,t +
aβ
(1− a)ktEt(ul,t+1lt+1)− (1− δ)βEtuc,t+1 = 0, (16)
where discretionary government spending has been substituted away using (10). The
optimality conditions for the government problem are as follows:
[ct] : uc,t − ug,t + µt[ucc,t(ct + kt − φb2t − (1− δ)kt−1 − bt−1) + uc,t] + (17)
+µt−1ucc,tbt−1 + ηtucc,t − ηt−1(1− δ)ucc,t = 0, (18)
[lt] : ul,t + ug,tyl,t +
ull,tlt + ul,t
1− a (
aηt−1
kt−1
− µt) = 0, (19)
[kt] : µtuc,t − ug,t + βEt[ug,t+1(yk,t+1 + 1− δ)− µt+1(1− δ)uc,t+1 − aηtul,t+1lt+1
(1− a)k2t
] = 0,(20)
[bt] : 2µtφbtuc,t + βEt(µt+1uc,t+1 − µtuc,t+1) = 0, (21)
where µt and ηt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (15) and (16),
respectively.
In the deterministic steady state, the optimal fiscal policy is to keep public debt at
zero and to use tax receipts to finance public spending. In the presence of uncertainty,
the government bonds are used to partially smooth fluctuations in the economy. The level
of public debt at the stochastic steady state is finite (due to the presence of the debt
transaction cost) and can be positive or negative, depending on the utility parameters.
The discretionary component of public spending is distortionary: its size (captured by its
marginal utility) affects both the levels of allocations and their cyclical properties.
In the next section, we proceed with the calibration of the model economy to evalu-
ate the importance of the structure of government spending for the cyclical properties of
macroeconomic variables.
3.3 Calibration
We consider the U.S. data for the period 1962-2014 as the baseline for calibration. Ad-
ditionally, we split the data in two subperiods, before and after 1985, to account for the
change in macroeconomic volatility between these two subperiods. For the model calibra-
tion, we distinguish four sets of the model parameters:
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(1) α, β – the standard parameters the values for which are well-known from the
literature so that there is no need for additional calibration and, if done, calibration of
these parameters would not significantly affect the quantitative properties of the model;
(2) ρA, σ, ρm, and σε – the standard parameters characterizing the exogenous stochas-
tic processes in the model economy. We calibrate these parameters to the U.S. data as
explained below and obtain the values very similar to the values of these parameters used
in the related studies;
(3) m¯, A¯, δ, ϕc, ϕl, and ϕg – the parameters the values of which can potentially influence
the qualitative properties of the model economy and which we calibrate to match the first
moments of the data of interest;
(4) vc, vl, vg, ρ, and φ – the parameters the values of which can potentially influence
the qualitative properties of the economy and which we calibrate to match the second
moments of the data under study. There is some ambiguity about the empirical evidence
on the values of vc, vl, and vg. In this section we calibrate these parameters by choosing
them from a range of values generally accepted in the literature (e.g., [0.5;1.5] for vg, [2;4]
for vc and vl). We discuss the alternative sets of these parameters in the robustness checks.
The calibration procedure is as follows.
First, we set the discount factor β = 0.96 and the capital share α = 0.36. We choose
ρA, σ, and ρm, σε to match the Solow residual from the production function (3) and the
mandatory government spending, respectively, in the U.S. for the period 1962-2014 (both
series de-trended using differences of logarithms).
Second, we select the following parameters to match the deterministic steady state in
the baseline economy (covering the data for 1962-2014): We choose A¯ to normalize the
model-generated output at the deterministic steady state to one. We choose δ to match
the average share of total government spending in the GDP over 1962-2014, G¯. We set
m¯ = 0.5G¯ to match the average share of discretionary spending in the total government
spending over the period 1962-2014.
Third, we jointly select the parameters of the utility function and the multiplier of the
debt transaction cost as follows: The weights in the utility function ϕc, ϕl, and ϕg are set
to match the average consumption share of GDP (C/Y) and the average labor hours per
worker (L) in the U.S. over the period 1962-2014 (we impose ϕg = 1−ϕc−ϕl). The remain-
ing parameters - effective consumption elasticity υc, labor elasticity υl, public consumption
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elasticity υg, the weight of private consumption in the effective consumption of private and
merit goods, ρ, and the debt transaction cost parameter, φ, are set to minimize the differ-
ence between five model-generated moments and the data. The moments we consider are
the correlations with GDP (Y) of five macroeconomic indicators: private consumption (C);
government spending (G); discretionary government spending (m), average labor hours per
worker (L); and public debt (B).
The logic behind choosing these particular moments as targets in the calibration is
as follows. The volatility of variables in the model is defined, to a large extent, by the
volatility of the exogenous stochastic processes (A and m) and, therefore, does not change
significantly with variation in the other model parameters. Thus, we target the correlations
among the variables in the model and in the data; in particular, the linear correlations with
output. The model consists of the total of eight endogenous variables (Y, I, C, G, g, L, B,
τ). The correlations of investment and consumption move closely together as we change
the parameters; therefore, we choose as a target the correlation of one of these variables
with output. Our numerical experiments suggest that we cannot replicate the correlation
between taxes and output within a plausible set of parameter values. Therefore, we do
not target this correlation in our calibration. We are left with C, L, B, G, and g. In the
next section we discuss different calibration strategies as a part of the robustness check. In
particular, we discuss the role of the utility parameters measuring the inverses of elasticities
– vc, vl, vg – in determining quantitative properties of the data.
We de-trend all the variables in the data and in the model using the differences of
logarithms. We use the optimality conditions to approximate the model around the steady
state (with the help of DYNARE) and rely on the model dynamics around the steady state
to compute the moments of interest.
The parameters of the model and the calibration targets are summarized in Table 2;
the model-generated moments together with corresponding moments for the U.S. data are
reported in Table 3. The model successfully captures the sign of the correlations with
output for all the variables except of the tax receipts (which are acyclical in the data
and countercyclical in the model). Moreover, the strength of the relationship among the
variables measured by the absolute value of the correlation is also accounted by the model
fairly well.
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Table 2: The model parameters, calibration targets, and values.
Parameter Value Target in Model in Data
α 0.36 – – –
β 0.96 – – –
ρA 0.93 autocor(∆ lnAt) 0.93 0.93
σ 0.01 var(∆ lnAt) 0.01 0.01
ρm 0.92 autocor(∆ lnmt) 0.92 0.92
σε 0.05 var(∆ lnmt) 0.05 0.05
m¯ 0.5 mean(m/G) 0.50 0.50
A¯ 1.37 mean(Y) 1.00 –
δ 0.06 mean(G/Y) 0.18 0.18
ϕc 0.02 mean(C/Y) 0.65 0.65
ϕl 0.77 mean(L) 0.32 0.32
υc 3.80 cor(∆ lnC,∆ lnY ) 0.72 0.87
υl 3.35 cor(∆ lnL,∆ lnY ) 0.55 0.45
υg 0.87 cor(∆ lnG,∆ lnY ) -0.43 -0.27
ρ 0.59 cor(∆ ln g,∆ lnY ) 0.03 0.03
φ 10−4 cor(∆ lnB,∆ lnY ) -0.13 -0.37
The targets values in the data are obtained from the U.S. data over the period 1962-2014. Data sources:
The U.S. Budget Historical Tables (Y, G, g, m, B); the World Bank (I, C); the OECD Statistics (L). The
targets values in the model are obtained from the model simulations around the steady state.
The volatility of the model-generated variables is lower than the volatility of these
variables in the data. The relative volatilities are captured by the model relatively well
for investment (about three times more volatile than output both in the model and in the
data) and total government spending (2.8 times more volatile than output in the model
and 2.2 times more volatile that output in the data). The volatility of public debt is much
lower than in the data and the volatility of labor hours is twice as high as in the data.
Given that the model relatively successfully replicates the pattern of the moments of
interests (in particular, the correlation between G and Y and the relative variances of the
data), we proceed by applying this model to the analysis of the effect of a change in the
structure of government spending which occurred in the U.S. during the 1980s and which
is reported in Figure 1.
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Table 3: Simulated model moments and the U.S. data moments over 1962-2014.
Mean(X) Cor(∆ lnX,∆ lnY ) Var∆ ln(X), %
X Model Data X Model Data X Model Data
Y 1.00 – Y 1.00 1.00 Y 1.39 2.10
I/Y 0.16 0.23 I 0.57 0.84 I 4.21 7.11
C/Y 0.65* 0.65* C 0.72* 0.87* C 2.71 1.83
G/Y 0.18* 0.18* G -0.43* -0.27* G 3.88 4.32
g/G 0.50 0.50 g 0.03* 0.03* g 2.25 4.63
m/G 0.50* 0.50* m -0.59 -0.39 m 5.86 5.98
L 0.32* 0.32* L 0.55* 0.45* L 1.28 0.63
b/Y 0.00 0.38 b -0.12* -0.37* b 1.48 6.46
τ 18.0 20.5 τ -0.79 0.00 τ 1.61 4.07
The model moments are obtained from the model simulations around the steady state given the
parameter values reported in Table 2. The data moments are calculated from the U.S. data over the
period 1962-2014. The moments targeted in calibration are presented with *. Data sources: The U.S.
Budget Historical Tables (Y, G, g, m, B); the World Bank (I, C); the OECD Statistics (L, τ).
4 Results
We use the model described in the previous section to analyze the role of discretionary
and mandatory government spending for macroeconomic volatility and for the cyclical
properties of fiscal policy. In particular, we evaluate the consequences of the change in
the fraction of mandatory public spending in total public spending in the U.S. over the
period 1962-2014, observed from Figure 1. This fraction increased since 1980s: mandatory
spending accounted, on average, for around 40% of total government outlays before 1985
and for around 60% of total government outlays after 1985. At the same time, the total
government spending as a share of GDP remained relatively constant during this period.
We ask whether these facts, incorporated in the model, can account for the change in the
characteristics of the U.S. data described in Section 2.
In order to evaluate the role of the structure of public spending in these observations,
we simulate the model by setting m¯ = 0.4G¯ and m¯ = 0.6G¯, keeping G/y constant to match
the respective data in the U.S. before and after 1985. Table 4 present the results generated
by the model and corresponding moments in the data.
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Table 4: Simulated model moments and the U.S. data moments before and after 1985.
X Model Data Model Data X Model Data Model Data
1962-1984 1985-2014 1962-1984 1985-2014
Mean(X)
Y 0.91 – 1.00 – m/G 0.41 0.40 0.61 0.57
I/Y 15.9 0.24 16.0 0.22 L 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.31
C/Y 0.66 0.63 65.4 0.67 B/Y 1.35 0.30 1.12 0.45
G/Y 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 τ 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.20
Corr(∆ ln(X),∆ lnY ) Var(∆ ln(X)) in %
Y 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Y 1.42 2.50 1.36 1.70
I 0.54 0.85 0.61 0.82 I 4.27 8.27 4.16 6.08
C 0.74 0.81 0.72 0.95 C 2.70 1.94 2.73 1.72
G -0.42 -0.17 -0.46 -0.47 G 3.53 4.32 4.23 4.32
g -0.04 0.21 0.09 -0.21 g 2.26 4.79 2.24 4.57
m -0.60 -0.47 -0.57 -0.47 m 5.86 6.01 5.86 5.76
L 0.58 0.47 0.53 0.53 L 1.34 0.73 1.22 0.53
b -0.13 -0.08 -0.12 -0.62 b 1.37 5.91 1.60 6.67
τ -0.78 -0.20 -0.80 0.07 τ 1.40 2.99 1.85 4.46
The model moments are obtained from the model simulations around the steady state given parameter
values reported in Table 2 for m¯ = 0.4G¯ and m¯ = 0.6G¯ for periods 1962-1984 and 1985-2014, respectively.
The data moments are calculated from the U.S. data over the periods 1962-1984 and 1985-2014,
respectively. Data sources: The U.S. Budget Historical Tables (Y, G, g, m, B); the World Bank (I, C);
the OECD Statistics (L, τ).
The results suggest that the distinction between mandatory and discretionary public
spending in the optimal fiscal policy model allows to account for a fraction of the reduction
in output volatility during the Great Moderation in the U.S.: volatility of output decreases
by 47% in the data and by 4.4% in the model. The volatility of most of the remaining
variables in the model also follows the trend in the data: investment, discretionary spend-
ing, and labor hours are less volatile when mandatory public spending is higher, while the
volatility of public debt and taxes increases with higher fraction of mandatory spending
in total government spending. The exceptions are the private consumption and the total
government spending: their volatility decreases (for C) or stays constant (for G) in the data
but increases in the model. One possible reason for the contradictory prediction regarding
17
the public spending volatility is that the mandatory spending by construction is equally
volatile in the model before and after 1985, while in the data its volatility decreases after
1985. Imposing a smaller variance on the mandatory spending process after 1985 would en-
hance the decline in macroeconomic volatility (in particular, it would reduce the volatility
of output, private consumption, and discretionary public spending).
The model also accounts for a rise in the countercyclicality of total government spend-
ing: comparing the periods before and after an increase in the fraction of mandatory
spending (before and after 1985) the correlation between G and Y decreases from -0.17 to
-0.47 in the data and from -0.42 to -0.46 in the model.
Intuitively, the cyclicality of total government spending depends on the cyclical prop-
erties of its components: discretionary and mandatory spending. A rise in mandatory
public spending act as a negative shock to output: more resources have to be devoted to
mandatory government consumption, and less to the other spending components includ-
ing discretionary spending and investment in physical capital. Thus, mandatory spending
and output are negatively correlated and a larger fraction of mandatory spending in to-
tal government spending decreases procyclicality (or increases countercyclicality) of fiscal
policy.
Discretionary public spending distorts equilibrium allocations, reducing the ability of
the other government tools to smooth the effect of fluctuations on the economy. This can be
seen from the optimality conditions to the government problem, presented in the appendix:
reducing the fraction of distortionary public spending is equivalent to reducing the marginal
utility from public spending (through a reduction in the parameter reflecting preferences
for distortionary spending captured by ϕg), which in turn reduces the public-effective
household consumption wedge and labor-public consumption wedge, increasing the ability
of the government to use taxes to smooth consumption, labor, and, consequently, capital
accumulation. The latter implies an important result: Keeping total government share
of GDP constant and increasing mandatory spending leads to higher consumption, labor,
capital, and output at the new stochastic steady state.7 Our numerical experiments suggest
that the parameters capturing the inverses of elasticities, vc, vl, and vg, influence the first
moments in a non-trivial way. In particular, more elastic public consumption (lower vg) is
7If we shut down all the shocks, in a deterministic economy higher fraction of mandatory spending
increases labor, taxes, and output, but the private consumption and capital at the steady state are unaf-
fected.
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more distortionary, in the sense that it leads to lower output at the stochastic steady state,
other things being equal. In contrast, more elastic effective private consumption (lower vc)
implies that discretionary public spending is less distortionary, leading to greater output
at the stochastic steady state, other things being equal. Together, the relative elasticities
of the utility components define, in a highly nonlinear way, the cyclical properties of fiscal
variables (see Grechyna, 2015 for the related discussion of the cyclical properties of a model
economy without physical capital).
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that the model-generated investment share,
private consumption share, and the labor hours do not replicate the pattern observed in
the U.S. data: the change in the average values of these variables in the data before and
after 1985 is opposite to their change in the model when we compare the economies with
m¯ = 0.4 and m¯ = 0.6. One reason for this discrepancy could be that the model abstracts
from any type of structural change that could affect the growth rates and the allocation of
output among the spending categories.
Returning to the characteristics of the U.S. data over 1962-2014, summarized in four
facts in Section 2, we can conclude that incorporating facts 1 and 2 in a standard neoclas-
sical model of optimal fiscal policy allows to replicate facts 3 and 4. Next, we provide some
intuition behind these results and analyze whether they can withstand some modifications
of the assumptions underlying the model economy.
4.1 Intuition and Robustness Checks
In order to gain more insights into the dependence of the model outcomes on model as-
sumptions, we consider the role of the main building blocks of the model in more detail.
The Role of the Shocks
First, we analyze the role of the exogenous shocks. Figures 3 and 4 present the impulse-
response functions to one standard deviation positive shock to technology and mandatory
government spending, respectively. Each of the two shocks leads to a fall in labor hours and
taxes, and a rise in total government spending, discretionary spending, and public debt.
The effect on output, private consumption, and investment is positive for a technology
shock and negative for a government spending shock, as expected. An increase in the frac-
tion of mandatory spending reduces the effect of each of the shocks on output, investment,
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to 1 st.dev. shock to technology At.
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The graphs show the responses in the model economies with m¯ = 0.4G¯ (solid line), m¯ = 0.5G¯ (dashed
line), and m¯ = 0.6G¯ (dotted line).
and private consumption – reflecting a reduction in the distortionary component of public
spending.
In order to investigate which shock has more importance for the cyclical properties of
fiscal variables, we consider two sub-versions of the baseline economy, which we denote by
M0, as follows:
M0,A: the model with σε = 0, and all the other parameter values from Table 2. This
model has only one exogenous shock – shock to technology.
M0,m: the model with σ = 0, and all the other parameter values from Table 2. This
model has only one exogenous shock – shock to mandatory public spending.
We compare the change in the volatility and correlations of the variables generated by
models M0,A and M0,m as we move from m¯ = 0.4 to m¯ = 0.6. The signs of the changes
in these moments are reported in the third and fourth rows of Table 5. The first two
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to 1 st.dev. shock to mandatory spending mt.
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The graphs show the responses in the model economies with m¯ = 0.4G¯ (solid line), m¯ = 0.5G¯ (dashed
line), and m¯ = 0.6G¯ (dotted line).
rows of this table report the signs of the corresponding changes in the data and in the
baseline model M0, respectively. The comparison of the outcomes of the three models
suggests that removing the mandatory spending shock does not have any consequences for
the direction of the changes in volatility when the average fraction of mandatory spending
in the economy changes. The changes in the correlations are more affected: removing the
government spending shock leads to higher correlation between total government spending
and output as m¯ increases, opposite to what occurs in the data. Thus, we conclude that
both the level and the presence of variation in mandatory public spending are important
for replication of the empirical facts listed in Section 3.
The Role of the Utility Parameters
In the baseline model we calibrated the parameters capturing the elasticities of substi-
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Table 5: The signs of the changes in the volatility and correlation as m¯ increases from 0.4
to 0.6., for different sub-versions of the model.
∆Var∆ ln(X) ∆Cor∆ ln(X,Y)
X Y I C G g L B τ I C G g m L B τ
Data - - - = - - + + - + - - = + - +
M0 - - + + - - + + + - - + + - + -
M0,A - - + + - - + + + + + + + - + -
M0,m - - + - + = - + + - - + + = - -
M1 + + + + + + + + + - - + - + + +
M2 - - + + - - + + + - - + + - + -
M3 - + + + + + + + - - - - + + + -
M4,1 + + + + + + + + + - - + - + + -
M4,2 - + - + - - + + + - - + + - + +
tution in the utility function. We have chosen to do this to bring the model correlations
closer to those in the data. Here we consider alternative values for vc, vl, and vg and their
role in shaping the quantitative and qualitative features of the model.
We consider several variations of these parameters, usually applied in the literature
(with the values of all the remaining parameters set as described in Table 2):
M1: vc = vl = vg = 1. This is the case of utility logarithmic in all the arguments.
M2: vc = 2.5, vl = 3, vg = 1. These are the typical parameter values for CRRA utility
of the form considered in this paper. The parameter for public consumption is set given
that its estimates in developed countries vary between 0.8 and 1.1 (Debortoli and Nunes,
2013).
Table 5 (rows 5 and 6) report the signs of the changes in the volatility and correlations
of the variables generated by these versions of the model economy as m¯ increases from 0.4
to 0.6. While the change in the correlations is almost unaffected relative to the baseline,
the volatility of all the variables increases for M1 as the fraction of mandatory spending
increases. ForM2, the signs of the changes in the volatility are equivalent to those from the
baseline model, for all the variables. However, the absolute values of the second moments
(not reported) are further from the data in comparison with the baseline model. Thus,
the calibration strategy chosen in section 3 is not innocent: the utility parameters play an
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important role in the ability of the model to replicate the empirical facts.
The Role of the Effective Consumption Function
We evaluate the importance of non-separability between private consumption and manda-
tory spending for the cyclical properties of the model economy by considering the following
sub-version of the model (with the values of all the remaining parameters set as described
in Table 2):
M3: ρ = 1. In this case the utility from private consumption is independent from the
mandatory spending. The only way this spending influences the economy is through the
resource constraint. Table 5 (row 7) reports the results of the simulations of this version
of the model. The changes in volatility are very different from those in the data and in the
baseline economy. Therefore, the non-separability between private and mandatory public
consumption is crucial for replication of the empirical facts.
Finally, we consider the effective consumption of CES form: Ct = (ρcγt + (1− ρ)mγt )
1
γ ,
with γ < 1. This form of effective consumption is less restrictive than the Cobb-Douglas
form considered in the baseline model; it allows to evaluate the importance of the degree
of substitutability/complementarity between private consumption and mandatory public
spending. We consider two subcases (with the values of all the remaining parameters set
as described in Table 2):
M4,1: γ = 0.5 (private and public consumption are substitutes).
M4,2: γ = −0.5 (private and public consumption are complements).
The behavior of the second moments is summarized in Table 5, rows 8 and 9. The sub-
stitutability assumption (M4,1) results in an increase in all of the variances as m¯ increases
from 0.4 to 0.6, while the complementarity between private and mandatory consumption
(M4,2) delivers the responses in line with those observed in the data (for majority of the
variables).
The CES effective consumption function adds another parameter to the model, γ, and
allows to generate a wider range of the values for the correlations between total govern-
ment spending and output. In particular, varying γ (in the range γ < 0, to generate the
moments consistent with the data) allows to achieve various degrees of pro- or counter-
cyclicality of fiscal policy. Intuitively, a rise in the mandatory public spending act as a
negative government spending shock: more resources have to be devoted to government
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Figure 5: The correlation between total government spending and output in the model as a
function of the fraction of mandatory public spending, for different values of CES effective
consumption parameters.
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consumption, thus output decreases. Given that mandatory spending is complementary
to private consumption, private consumption declines in response to a negative shock to
mandatory spending. Therefore, a larger fraction of mandatory spending in total gov-
ernment spending decreases procyclicality (or increases countercyclicality) of fiscal policy
and reduces positive correlation between consumption and output. In Figure 5 we plot
the model-generated correlation between the total government spending G and output y
(both series detrended by the differences of logarithms) as a function of the degree of
complementarity and the weight attached to the private consumption. The higher the
complementarity between private consumption and mandatory spending (captured by the
parameter γ) is, the lower the correlation between output and public spending is. Keeping
the complementarity parameter constant, the higher the share of private consumption in
total effective household consumption (captured by the parameter ρ) is, the higher the
correlation between output and public spending is. By varying these two parameters of
the effective consumption, we can achieve any correlation level, which in principle could
match the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in any country given the fraction of mandatory
24
public spending in the country. In particular, we can generate procyclical fiscal policies
when ρ is high (mandatory spending does not contribute much to the household utility)
and countercyclical fiscal policy when ρ is relatively low.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a stylized model of optimal fiscal policy with a distinction
between mandatory and discretionary public spending. We showed that higher fraction
of mandatory spending in total government spending leads to less volatile business cycles
and reduces procyclicality of fiscal policy. Our findings reiterate on the importance of
“rules-based” policy for economic stability and welfare.
We have considered several variations of the model economy described in this paper;
our conclusions remain robust. In particular, the absence of public debt or the absence
of government commitment to its fiscal plan does not affect the qualitative features of the
model economy described in this paper.
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Appendix
Deriving the statement of the government problem
Substitute taxes and bond price from (5) and (7) into (4) to obtain:
ct + kt + βEt
uct+1
uct
bt − φb2t = −
ul,t
uc,twt
(wtlt + rtkt−1) + (1− δ)kt−1 + bt−1, (22)
also substitute taxes into (6) to obtain:
uc,t − βEtuc,t+1(− ul,t+1
uc,t+1wt+1
rt+1 + 1− δ) = 0. (23)
The last two equations summarize four households optimality conditions. The resource
constraint defines the level of discretionary spending that equilibrates the budget.
Simplifying these equations obtains:
uct(ct + kt − φb2t − (1− δ)kt−1 − bt−1) + βEtuct+1bt +
ul,tlt
1− a = 0, (24)
uc,t +
aβ
(1− a)ktEt(ul,t+1lt+1)− (1− δ)βEtuc,t+1 = 0. (25)
Then, the problem of the government (Ramsey problem) can be formulated as follows:
max
{ct,lt,kt,bt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct,mt, 1− lt, gt) (26)
s.t. : (10), (24), (25). (27)
The optimality conditions for the government problem
We reformulate government problem (26)-(27) using the approach suggested by Marcet
and Marimon (2011) as follows:
min
{µt,ηt}∞t=0
max
{ct,lt,kt,bt}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt{u(ct,mt,−lt, yt + (1− δ)kt−1 − ct − kt −mt)−
−µt[uct(ct + kt − φb2t − (1− δ)kt−1 − bt−1) +
ul,t
1− alt]−
−µt−1uc,tbt−1 + ηtuc,t + ηt−1 aul,tlt
(1− a)kt−1 − ηt−1uc,t(1− δ)},
µ−1 = 0, η−1 = 0, k−1, b−1 − given.
This formulation lead to the optimality conditions presented in the main text.
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